ABSTRACT

The need for epistemic growth is an evidence of the groans of human epistemic deficit of perfection. Down the line, this signals a continual need for advancement in epistemic levels. An endeavor towards epistemic improvement has so much to gain from peer disagreement, which has the potential to bring about a change or affirmation or improvement of formerly held beliefs and epistemic positions. An epistemology of disagreement is that founded on peer epistemic contention and its vast possibilities for the shaping, reshaping, affirmation and discarding of certain knowledge claims or arguments. Using various written sources, this paper exposes the various points from opposing sides on the disagreement concerning whether the human mind has innate ideas or modules as structures constituting the basis and content of cognition. Upon reflection on the different positions, the paper concludes that modularity is a rebranded term for innateness with improved explanation of the workings of the mind. This impacts metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language as well as philosophy of the mind, neurology and psychology.